The Supreme Court’s Code of Conduct

An Analysis and the Likelihood of Success

By Kayla A. Curtin

Kayla Curtin is a 2024 graduate of Albany Law School. She was raised on her family’s potato farm in rural Steuben County, New York.

Prior to attending law school, Kayla earned dual bachelor’s degrees from Le Moyne College in history and political science. During law school, Kayla served as a law clerk at the Barbaruolo Law Firm and served as a bankruptcy fellow at Legal Aid of Western New York (LAWNY).

Kayla is beginning her legal career as an Assistant Public Defender for the Monroe County Public Defender’s Office in Rochester, New York.

Scandal is not a new concept to the United States Supreme Court. In the last several years, members of the current Roberts Court have faced scrutiny from the American public regarding their activities outside the courtroom. On November 13, 2023, the United States Supreme Court issued its first-ever Judicial Code of Conduct, based on the Judicial Code of Conduct set forth by the American Bar Association and the United States Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Supreme Court’s Code of Conduct is a direct response and an attempt at bandaging the oozing wound of controversy that has surrounded the Roberts Court. But the Supreme Court has been hearing cases where the Justices should have recused themselves due to acts of impropriety and other causes for decades. Despite all of this, the Code lacks methods of enforcement and other important procedural details for the Justices to follow regarding disqualification and recusal.

The first part of this paper will introduce the three codes of conduct and a brief background on their effectiveness, focusing on disqualification and recusal. The second part of this paper is a comparison of the three codes of conduct. Here, the paper makes an inference as to whether the Supreme Court’s Code goes far enough in terms of disqualification and recusal. Further, the paper examines whether the Justices are capable of being the ones to decide when they are disqualified or should recuse themselves. The third part of this paper is an analysis of past cases in which judges have refused to recuse themselves.  It also infers, based on the Supreme Court’s Code, whether the result would be different if the same or similar situation were to occur again. The fourth and final part of this paper is a conclusion and a proposal that if the Supreme Court does not propose additional canons or an effective enforcement mechanism, the Code may come to be known as a flimsy Band-Aid to cover a long history of controversy.

Author's Note: While this paper is critical of the judicial system, its purpose is not to lead readers to believe all judges fail to abide by the codes of conduct mentioned in this paper. Rather, this paper focuses on some of the more infamous failures to recuse, encourages all judges to continue holding themselves accountable, and acknowledges the importance of a partisan judge.

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To read the paper, open HERE.

Judge Cooke: The Man and His Impact on the Law

By Anthony Sokolowski

Anthony Sokolowski, a third year student at Albany Law School, is the Editor-in-Chief of the Center for Judicial Process. He graduated from Utica College in 2016 with a bachelors in political science and minor in philosophy.  In addition to serving as EIC of the Center, Anthony is also the Executive Editor of Albany Law's Government Law Review and the Treasurer of the Italian American Law Society. Upon graduation, Anthony will be working as an Assistant Distract Attorney at the Oneida County District Attorney's Office.


Lawrence Henry Cooke has been described as “a giant . . . [i]n every good and important way.” For a man who began his work days at four in the morning, it cannot be overstated how impressive his impact on the law, not only on the subject matter he covered, but also on the people he encountered along the way.

This paper examines the Judge’s rise to the court, his key decisions as an associate judge and how they impacted they law as well as his decisions as Chief Judge and their impact on the law. The impact will focus mostly on the impact his opinions had on the criminal law field. Lastly, this work concludes with a discussion on his impact on the people he worked with and concluding remarks.

Born in Monticello, New York, Judge Cooke was heavily influenced by his father, George, who as a graduate of Albany Law School, was elected Sullivan County District Attorney in 1909. George Cooke made the transition from attorney to judge when he was elected to County Judge of the Surrogate and Children’s Court in 1926, a position he would spend the next twenty-two years working. Judge Cooke would learn from his father a lesson he would continue to share throughout his career, “when in doubt, always take the high road.”

Judge Cooke originally attended Harvard Law School before transferring to Albany Law School to obtain his law degree. He began his practice at the law office of John Lyons. While in private practice, he also worked as a volunteer fireman, was elected as Supervisor of the Town of Thompson and even filled his father shoes by becoming elected to the County Judge of Surrogate and Children’s Court in 1959. This ultimately led to his becoming elected to the Justice of the Supreme Court in the Third Department of New York in 1961, which then led to a cross party nomination by then Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1968 to New York State’s Appellate Division, Third Department.
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To read the paper, open HERE.

Reversal by Recusal?

Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. and Mandatory Judicial Recusal Statements

by Patrick Woods

Patrick Woods, a second-year student at Albany Law School and Associate Editor of the Albany Law Review, explores the ramifications of judicial recusals without any explanation. He proposes statutory requirements that judges issue public statements explaining their recusals.

In many cases, if not most, voluntary judicial recusal is both an efficient use of judicial resources and an exceptional safeguard to the legitimacy of the judiciary.[1]  However, voluntary judicial recusal poses its own unique problems when the withdrawing judge declines to issue a statement explaining the statutory grounds for his or her recusal.  Unlike when a party seeks to disqualify a judge by motion--where the reasons for recusal will, at a minimum, be set out in the motion papers--when a judge voluntarily recuses, there is not necessarily any record created as to the reasons for the recusal.[2]  Such recusals leave litigants in the dark, creating numerous practical problems.  These problems are compounded when, prior to recusal, the judge has already taken meaningful action in the case.

This article will analyze the recent case of Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc. in an effort to illustrate several of the many reasons why federal judges, upon voluntary recusal, should be required to issue a statement identifying the statutory provision requiring their disqualification.  The article will also argue that where a judge is recusing him or herself from a case in which he or she has already substantially participated, litigants should be permitted to demand, and receive, a more detailed statement as to the reasons for recusal.

First, to put the arguments in context, this article will lay out the highly unusual procedural history of Comer. Next, the article will use the facts of Comer to illustrate several problems created, exacerbated, or made insoluble by voluntary recusal without the issuance of a recusal statement.  Finally, the article will propose two statutory provisions for suggested inclusion in federal judicial recusal statutes. Those provisions would require judges to issue basic recusal statements whenever they become disqualified and more detailed statements in appropriate circumstances without overburdening the judiciary.

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[1] Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 229, 234 (2010) (voluntary recusal "promote[s] judicial economy [and] minimize[s] public scrutiny and criticism" of courts.)  This article is limited to recusal issues involving the federal judiciary because the federal system has one unified standard; the federal statute or language similar to that found in those statutes have been adopted by several states; and the illustrating case, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc., is a federal case.  That said, many of the arguments for mandatory recusal statements would apply with equal force in the context of state courts.

[2] In addition to the reasons for recusal being set out in motion papers, judges are also strongly encouraged to issue statements when they deny disqualification motions.  See Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges § 22.1 (2007).  Some jurisdictions even make the issuance of the such statements mandatory.  See id.

Read the entire paper here.