The Ups and Downs of New York's Right to Counsel: The Cooke, Lippman, and DiFiore Courts

By Chloe Petry

Chloe Petry is a 2025 graduate of Albany Law School. Prior to attending Albany Law School, she earned a bachelor’s degree from SUNY Fredonia, studying Biology and Botany. In law school, Chloe was the Managing Editor for Production, Research, and Writing for the Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 35. She was also the President of the Albany Law School Environmental Law Society.

New York’s state constitutional right to counsel is far more robust and expansive than its federal counterpart due to the New York Court of Appeals’ (“the Court”) extensive review of the right, which furthered constitutional protections for the accused. However, as this paper will discuss, the Court’s review has not always been as progressive, nor has it continued to build on existing precedent.

It appears the Court has taken steps backwards and weakened the right. The New York Constitution holds that any “suspect in a criminal matter . . . who requests representation may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney.” Also, “[b]y extension, a suspect who has invoked the right cannot voluntarily waive the right to counsel without an attorney present.”  This right is described as “indelible:” s defined as “marks that cannot easily be removed.” 

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To read the paper, open HERE.